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HIRING CRITERIA AND TITLE VII:
HOW ONE MANIFESTATION OF EMPLOYER BIAS EVADES
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
Max Londberg1

I. INTRODUCTION
Writing in 1988, feminist and critical race scholar Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw described the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (commonly known as
“Title VII”) as contributing to the removal of “most formal barriers and
symbolic manifestations of subordination.”2 But the Act and other
reforms ultimately fell short, for a “challenge to the legitimacy of
continued racial inequality would force whites to confront myths about
equality of opportunity that justify for them whatever measure of
economic success they may have attained.”3 One such myth holds that
merit alone guides hiring decisions. This myth conceals subordination by
race and gender.
In 1964, Congress declared it unlawful for employers to “fail or refuse
to hire . . . any individual because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”4 Some were hopeful that Title VII’s
legal requirement to assess a job applicant free from discrimination would
curb hiring bias.5 But colorblind ideology has hindered the law’s
function.6 Recent federal court decisions are continuing this trend by
1. Blog Editor, University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author is most grateful to Marisa
Moore, Danny O’Connor, Sean Meyer, Lisa Rosenof, and Paul Rando, for their insightful edits, and to
Professor Sandra F. Sperino, whose instruction and mentorship inspired and enhanced this Comment.
2. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1348, 1378 (1988).
3. Id. at 1381.
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964).
5. See M.S. Handler, N.A.A.C.P. Plans to Intensify Attack on Job Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 1964, at 14, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1964/06/26/106980026.html?page
Number=14 [https://perma.cc/Y9RS-5YXJ] (reporting that the NAACP planned to “charge a number of
corporations and labor unions with discriminatory practices when the new civil rights bill goes into effect”
and describing NAACP report that charged some union groups with fostering “virtually closed
memberships” and General Motors Corporation with failing to provide equal-employment opportunities).
Cf. Martin Luther King Jr., In a Word—NOW, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1963, at T92,
https://www.nytimes.com/1963/09/29/archives/in-a-wordnow.html?smid=url-share [https://perma.cc/34
85-D964] (describing the civil rights bill amid discussion of deconstructing barriers “NOW” and writing:
“NOW means jobs, F.E.P.C., training, leveling obstacles of discrimination . . .”). But see Stephen Tuck,
Powerless at Home, Dangerous Abroad: The Civil Rights Act According to Malcolm X, 24 NEW LAB. F.
69, 70 (2015) (describing Malcolm X’s disdain for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and quoting him as saying,
in a 1964 speech to Oxford students, “No matter how many bills pass, [B]lack people in that country,
where I’m from, still our lives are not worth two cents.”).
6. See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1344-45. Crenshaw criticizes colorblind ideology, as it
would make:
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preventing legal redress for a particular manifestation of implicit bias in
hiring — a barrier that is contrary to Title VII. The barrier this Comment
addresses is judicial oversight of bias that causes employers to alter hiring
criteria, often in favor of white male applicants.7 This oversight results in
unchecked discrimination. This Comment calls for increased judicial
scrutiny of this manifestation of racism.
This Comment will explore the issue through an analysis of relevant
caselaw and social science literature. The next Section of this Comment
reviews judicial decisions interpreting the purpose of Title VII, to
demonstrate its broad reach. Section II also highlights a less-invoked
subsection of Title VII that further supports its expansiveness. Section II
then describes summary judgment in the Title VII context before
introducing four federal cases, all of which involved inconsistent hiring
criteria that diminished the strengths of marginalized candidates. In
Section III, this Comment illustrates how, in the four cases, the
employers’ hiring criteria were inconsistent. This Section also reviews the
social science literature demonstrating how inconsistent hiring criteria are
a bellwether for bias. Ultimately, Section III argues that the broad scope
of Title VII should preclude summary judgment for employers whose
hiring criteria shift, to the detriment of an otherwise qualified,
marginalized applicant and to the benefit of a majority applicant. Finally,
Section IV concludes by reiterating the main arguments against
constricting the scope of Title VII in the manner employed by certain
federal courts.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section begins by surveying general hiring discrimination
research before reviewing social science literature detailing the manner
of discrimination that is the subject of this Comment: shifting hiring
criteria to favor white applicants. 8 Part B describes the intended broad
no sense at all in a society in which identifiable groups had actually been treated differently
historically and in which the effects of this difference in treatment continued into the present. . . .
Arguments that differences in economic status cannot be redressed, or [that they] are legitimate
because they reflect cultural rather than racial inferiority, would have to be rejected; cultural
disadvantages themselves would be seen as the consequence of historical discrimination. One
could not look at outcomes as a fair measure of merit since one would recognize that not everyone
had been given an equal start.
Id.
7. See generally Julie E. Phelan, Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, & Laurie A. Rudman, Competent Yet
Out in the Cold: Shifting Criteria for Hiring Reflect Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 32 PSYCH. WOMEN
Q. 406 (2008); Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify
Discrimination, 16 PSYCH. SCI. 474 (2005).
8. The author agrees with the current guidance from the Associated Press to capitalize Black but
not white, and thus follow that convention in this Comment. See Explaining AP Style on Black and white,
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reach of Title VII, both via a common provision within the law as well as
a less prominent provision. Part C reviews how summary judgment
operates in disparate-treatment cases, and Part D notes several federal
cases in which employers shifted their hiring criteria.
A. Hiring Discrimination
Hiring decisions have an enormous effect on workers, serving a
“gatekeeping” function that blocks some but admits others to career
opportunities, positions of power, and higher income brackets. 9 Women
and racial minorities, by a process known as “allocative discrimination,”
are often channeled into different jobs with lesser pay than majority
members.10
The hiring process — compared to other employment decisions like
pay setting — is a stage of employment particularly vulnerable to
discrimination.11 A 2017 meta-analysis, which reviewed every hiring
discrimination field experiment since 1989, described the point of hire, as
compared to other stages of employment, as most conducive to concealing
discrimination due to the relative scarcity of available objective
information.12 Considering more than 55,000 applications, the researchers
determined white applicants were 36 percent more likely to receive a
callback from employers than were Black applicants. 13 The study also
found no change in the degree of discrimination that Black job seekers
experienced over nearly three decades.14 “African Americans remain
AP NEWS, https://apnews.com/article/archive-race-and-ethnicity-9105661462 [https://perma.cc/2X5ZVC2V] (last visited Dec 18, 2022).
9. Lauren A. Rivera, Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional Service Firms,
77 AM. SOCIO. REV. 999, 1000 (2012).
10. Emilio J. Castilla, Gender, Race, and Meritocracy in Organizational Careers, 113 AM. J.
SOCIO. 1479, 1480 (2008); see also Valentina Di Stasio & Edvard N. Larsen, The Racialized and
Gendered Workplace: Applying an Intersectional Lens to a Field Experiment on Hiring Discrimination
in Five European Labor Markets, 83 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 229, 229 (2020).
We find that employers prefer hiring white women over men for female-typed jobs. By contrast,
women of color do not have any advantage over men of the same race. Moreover, [B]lack and
Middle Eastern men encounter the strongest racial discrimination in male-typed jobs, where it is
possible that their stereotyped masculinity, made salient by the occupational context, is perceived
as threatening.
Id.
11. Trond Petersen & Ishak Saporta, The Opportunity Structure for Discrimination, 109 AM. J.
SOCIO. 852, 895-96 (2004) (describing hiring as “the point where discrimination is most feasible” in part
because of a “frequent lack of a complainant to press charges”).
12. Lincoln Quillian, Devah Pager, Ole Hexel, & Arnfinn H. Midtbøen, Meta-Analysis of Field
Experiments Shows No Change in Racial Discrimination in Hiring over Time, 114 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD.
SCIS. 10870, 10874 (2017).
13. Id. at 10871.
14. Id. at 10870.
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substantially disadvantaged relative to equally qualified whites,”
researchers wrote, “and we see little indication of progress over time.”15
A 2020 study revealed similar findings through an intersectional lens. 16
The study considered 19,000 job applications submitted to jobs with both
high and low educational requirements.17 Not only did the study find all
racial and ethnic “outgroups” faced disadvantage, but minority women
experienced “substantial ethnic and racial discrimination” compared to
majority women, who were “strongly preferred in female-dominated
occupations.”18 Majority women themselves are often overlooked in favor
of male candidates for stereotypically male positions.19
Social science literature reveals one manner in which bias alters hiring
decisions.20 Hiring officials may list certain criteria for open positions,
only to adjust those criteria as the hiring process progresses, disfavoring
a marginalized candidate. 21 This allows hiring officials to falsely claim
their decisions were based on merit.22
This bias often results in prioritizing white men over marginalized
applicants.23 This form of bias often surfaces in the following way: An
employer, ABC Company, posts a job opening, emphasizing certain
characteristics it desires in applicants. A marginalized applicant possesses
the sought-after characteristics; 24 for example, she may have an advanced
degree or certain experience purportedly sought by the employer. But as
hiring progresses, ABC hiring officials subtly (often subconsciously) shift
their emphasis among the desired characteristics or add wholly new
desired characteristics. This diminishes the value of the marginalized
candidate’s strengths, allowing ABC to justify passing her over for the
15. Id. at 10874. The analysis found only a “modest” decline in discrimination against Latinx
applicants. See id. at 10870.
16. Stasio & Larsen, supra note 10, at 231-32 (explaining that the intersectional perspective
originated in Black feminist scholarship and states that social constructions such as race, gender, and other
categories are best understood as relative to one another rather than independently) (“The common thread
of much of this literature is the expectation that [B]lack women, who are marginalized members of both
social dimensions, experience a double disadvantage that cannot be captured by gender or racial
discrimination alone.”).
17. Id. at 236.
18. Id. at 244.
19. Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 7, at 477.
20. Phelan et al., supra note 7, at 407.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 7, at 474-75 (“By defining merit in a manner tailored
to the idiosyncratic strengths of an applicant from the desired group, . . . decision makers can justify a
discriminatory decision by appealing to ostensibly ‘objective’ criteria”).
23. See, e.g., Phelan et al., supra note 7, at 407.
24. The studies cited in this Comment focus on the experiences of women and racial minorities.
Studies concerning inconsistent hiring criteria that center other marginalized groups, such as people who
are disabled or who identify as LGBTQIA+, are not as prominent in the literature. Other marginalized
groups are also likely to be subjected to this form of bias.
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job in favor of a white male.
The key in identifying this form of discrimination does not lie in the
employer-identified characteristics themselves but in the inconsistent
weight employers ascribe to these characteristics. 25 The desired
characteristics bend to the preferred majority candidate. For example, in
a 2004 study, male undergraduates were asked to select the best applicant
for a “stereotypically male job.”26 When applicant gender was not
revealed, more than three-fourths of students selected the better-educated
candidate over one with more job experience. 27 But when researchers
revealed applicant genders, and the best-educated candidate was female,
less than half of students selected her.28
B. Title VII Protection
The text of Title VII illustrates its broad reach. 29 Courts generally rely
on Section 703(a)(1) when hearing claims.30 But legal scholars such as
Martha Chamallas and Sandra F. Sperino argue that a companion
provision, Section 703(a)(2), provides further statutory protection against
discrimination.31 That provision makes it unlawful for an employer:
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.32

One form of Title VII violation is disparate treatment. Disparate
25. Id.
26. Michael I. Norton, Joseph A. Vandello, & John M. Darley, Casuistry and Social Category
Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 817, 820-21 (2004).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally Martha Chamallas, Exploring the ‘Entire Spectrum’ of Disparate Treatment
Under Title VII: Rules Governing Predominantly Female Jobs, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1984)
(describing Title VII, § 703(a)(1) as “broadly” outlawing discrimination “[o]n its face, . . . whether the
discrimination is explicit or covert”).
30. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973); City of L.A., Dep’t
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738
(2020).
31. Chamallas, supra note 29, at 5 n.19 (“The broad sweep of the language of Section [703(a)(2)],
particularly the prohibitions on segregation or classifications which adversely affect job opportunities,
provides additional statutory support for an expansive conception of discrimination stemming from rules
governing predominantly female jobs and occupations”). Cf. Sandra F. Sperino, Harassment: A Separate
Claim?, 6 BELMONT L. REV. 121, 145 (2019) (“The language of Title VII’s second operative provision
[Section 703(a)(2)] provides for a more expansive view of harassing behavior” and “harassment litigants
can argue for broader conceptions of discrimination under section (a)(2).”).
32. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (emphasis
added).
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treatment arises when “members of a race, sex, or ethnic group have been
denied the same employment, promotion, membership, or other
employment opportunities as have been available to other employees or
applicants.”33 The Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
laid a central framework for adjudicating disparate-treatment claims.34
Though the case did not concern inconsistent hiring criteria, victims of
such bias may rely on its framework in seeking legal redress. 35
Percy Green, a Black mechanic and civil rights activist, sued
McDonnell Douglas Corp. (“McDonnell Douglas”), an aerospace and
aircraft manufacturer. 36 McDonnell Douglas avowed that it rejected
Green’s application to be rehired, after he was laid off, because he had
previously engaged in a “stall-in.”37 Green asserted his rejection was
motivated by racial discrimination.38
The Court held that plaintiffs carry the initial burden to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.39 To do so, they must show that (1)
they are a member of a protected class; (2) they applied to and were
qualified for a position; (3) they were rejected; and (4) the employer hired
someone else or continued to seek other applicants. 40 The burden of
production then shifts to the defendant-employer, who must “articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s
rejection.”41 In the third and oft-contested step, a plaintiff can seek to
prove an employer’s stated reason was pretext offered to conceal a
discriminatory motive.42 The Court held that Green, on remand, must
have a “fair opportunity” to show McDonnell Douglas’ asserted reason
for not rehiring Green was pretextual. 43 Evidence could also be used to
support that McDonnell Douglas discriminated against Green while he
was employed or “followed a discriminatory policy toward [m]inority
employees.”44

33. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.11 (2022).
34. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
35. Stoe v. Barr, 960 F.3d 627, 639 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
36. Id. at 794.
37. Id. at 805 n.18 (describing the stall-in as tying up roads into the McDonnell Douglas facility
as part of a protest against racial discrimination after Green was terminated by McDonnell Douglas).
Green later applied to be rehired. Id.
38. Id. at 796.
39. Id. at 802.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 804.
43. Id. at 807.
44. Id. at 793. The Court also provided that Green could use as evidence McDonnell Douglas’
actions during his prior employment, the company’s reaction to his civil rights activities, and McDonnell
Douglas’ past practices with minority workers, potentially aided by statistical data. Id. at 804-05.
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C. Summary Judgment in Disparate-Treatment Cases
At the summary judgment stage, a key inquiry in disparate-treatment
cases is whether a plaintiff-applicant can present sufficient evidence to
persuade a reasonable jury that the plaintiff’s protected trait caused the
contested employment action, through pretext or other evidence. 45
Employers often move for summary judgment. Courts may only grant
such motions if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and
affidavits filed pursuant to discovery show that, first, “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact,” and, second, “the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.”46

In deciding whether to grant an employer’s motion for summary
judgment, judges do not determine if the evidence favors one party or the
other but whether a “fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmovant] . . . .”47
Circuit courts have developed similar standards for reviewing trial
court decisions to grant summary judgment in employment discrimination
cases. 48 To support the presence of pretext and thus defeat a motion for
summary judgment, plaintiffs must demonstrate “such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.”49 The Third
45.
46.
47.
48.

Stoe v. Barr, 960 F.3d 627, 640 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Stoe, 960 F.3d at 638 (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993).

Where direct “smoking gun” evidence of discrimination is unavailable, this court has found that
the proper inquiry is “whether evidence of inconsistencies and implausibilities in the employer's
proffered reasons for discharge reasonably could support an inference that the employer did not
act for non-discriminatory reasons, not whether the evidence necessarily leads to [the] conclusion
that the employer did act for discriminatory reasons.”
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs.,
Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (“To show pretext, Alvarez must demonstrate ‘such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.’”);
Youssef v. Holder, 19 F. Supp. 3d 167, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
In sum, the Court finds that the alleged inferences that the LCB voting members drew or failed to
draw do not rise to the level of showing “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.”
Youssef, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 196 (quoting Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005)).
49. Youssef, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 196 (quoting Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 2005));
see also Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850 F.3d 237, 242, 245 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that a “plaintiff may
show pretext either through evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is false or unworthy of credence”) (quoting Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d
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Circuit has held that the question is not “whether the evidence necessarily
leads to [the] conclusion that the employer did act for discriminatory
reasons” but whether it “could support an inference that the employer did
not act for non-discriminatory reasons . . . .”50
Some circuit courts, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, required
plaintiffs to show not just evidence of pretext but also evidence that
“discrimination motivated the challenged employment action.”51
However, the Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc. overturned what had become known as “pretext-plus,” thus removing
any requirement that plaintiffs provide evidence beyond showing
pretext.52 Reeves allows a factfinder to infer discrimination simply from
“the falsity of the employer’s explanation.”53 The case also “emphasized
the importance of jury fact finding” in discrimination cases.54 Several
circuit courts, contrary to the majority of circuits, continue to adhere to
standards that may flout Reeves.”55
D. Federal Courts Grapple With Inconsistent Hiring Criteria
In four cases considered by various circuit courts, female applicants
alleging discrimination under Title VII argued their claims were
supported by sufficient evidence to survive an employer motion for
summary judgment. In all cases but one, the courts affirmed or granted
summary judgment to employers. The respective hiring officials for the
employers shifted criteria during the selection process in all cases. Each
time, the shifting criteria worked against a female applicant and favored
a male applicant.56

374, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2010)).
50. Josey, 996 F.2d at 638 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
51. Edward Brunet, John Parry, & Martin Redish, Title VII and Other Discrimination Claims:
Issues of Intent and Credibility in a Civil Rights Summary Judgment Process Dominated by Burden
Shifting, in SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL LAW & PRACTICE § 9:11(c) (2021) (listing the First, Third,
Fifth, and Tenth Circuits as adopting this “pretext-plus” standard).
52. Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)).
53. Id.
54. Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2000).
55. Brunet et al., supra note 51, § 9:11(c) (listing four circuit courts with summary judgment
standards that are “ambiguous or resistant to Reeves”). See, e.g., Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist.,
803 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The burden placed on Title VII plaintiffs to produce additional
evidence suggesting discrimination after contradicting their employer's stated reasons is not great, but
neither is it nothing.”) (emphasis added).
56. Id. Three courts did not list the race of the winning applicant. Only one case listed the race of
two candidates who were selected over the plaintiff. Both men were white. See Lewis v. Cablevision Sys.
Corp., No. CIV08–2793, 2010 WL 1133872, at *8 (D.N.J Mar. 22, 2010).
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1. Pittman v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc.
In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit considered Pittman v. Johnson &
Johnson Vision Care, Inc., in which Johnson & Johnson (“J&J”) shifted
its hiring criteria, rejected a female applicant, and later faced an
accusation of sex discrimination.57 Mary Ann Pittman excelled in her job
at a subsidiary of J&J.58 She worked for the company for three decades,
eventually rising to a senior director role in the company’s supply-chain
division.59 Her supervisor, in 2014 and 2015, evaluated her performance,
giving her marks of “exceeds” and “fully meets” for her business and
leadership skills, respectively.60 In 2015, her supervisor considered her
prepared for a promotion to a vice presidency role.61 However, at a
succession meeting a few months before Pittman applied for a promotion,
managers downgraded her readiness level, citing a lack of external
experience. 62 They also claimed she lacked leadership and collaboration
experience. 63
When Pittman applied to the vice president vacancy in October 2015,
hiring managers chose not to interview her.64 The hiring managers
interviewed three men instead, and selected one for the position.65 When
Pittman asked for an explanation of her rejection, a manager cited
Pittman’s lack of experience outside the division where she had long
worked.66 The candidate chosen for the role had “several years of outside
experience.”67
But external experience was not among the written criteria that
managers had developed prior to interviews. 68 Posted criteria included a
supply-chain background and an ability to work at the leadership-team
level.69 Though the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged external experience
was not part of the written criteria, it decided that a jury could “at most”
view this as “an additional, but undisclosed, reason for the decision.”70
The court held this failed to demonstrate that J&J’s asserted reason for

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Pittman v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., 815 F. App’x 436, 437 (11th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 437.
Id.at 438.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 442-43.
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rejecting Pittman was pretextual, and no reasonable factfinder would find
the company’s rationale so “weak, implausible, inconsistent, incoherent
or contradictory” as to be “unworthy of credence.”71 The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to J&J.72
2. Pribyl v. County of Wright
About a month after the Pittman decision, in July 2020, the Eighth
Circuit decided Pribyl v. County of Wright.73 In a sparse opinion, the court
affirmed summary judgment for an employer, the Wright County
Sheriff’s Department in Minnesota (”Department”). 74
Amee Pribyl had more than 20 years of law enforcement experience
and held bachelor’s and master’s degrees when she applied for a sergeant
position.75 The selection of a new sergeant proceeded in three stages.
First, a software program ranked applicants based on screening
information, including years as a deputy and highest education obtained.76
The software program ranked Pribyl the highest among candidates, at
86.96 percent.77 Next, a three-person panel conducted interviews with
those who met minimum qualifications.78 The panel then selected finalists
for review by Sheriff Hagerty, who selected the candidate to be hired.79
But Pribyl was not among the five finalists selected by the panel.80 The
successful applicant, Drew Scherber, had an associate’s degree and less
experience in law enforcement than Pribyl.81 He earned the lowest rank
by the software program among applicants, at 52.17 percent.82 The court
described Pribyl’s interview as unimpressive to the panelists.83 She
merely recited the Department’s mission when asked how she would
carry out the mission.84 And when asked what barriers then hindered her
work, she described the need to remove her duty belt to use the
bathroom — a task men did not have to perform.85

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 443.
Id.
964 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id.
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After her rejection, Pribyl sued for sex discrimination under Title VII.86
In its decision affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to
the Department, the Eighth Circuit noted that Sheriff Hagerty stated in a
deposition that he believed a woman would not likely return to work after
giving birth.87
The Eighth Circuit considered whether the Department’s reason for
rejecting Pribyl — that she did not interview well — was pretextual. 88 It
ruled the Department’s justification was not pretext concealing a
discriminatory rationale.89 The court stated that objective criteria, such as
Pribyl’s superior education and experience, were amply considered in
selecting interviewees. 90 But the court accepted that the Department used
a subjective criterion — interview performance — to decide who would
be named a finalist.91 “[W]hen an employment decision relies on both
subjective and objective criteria,” the court wrote, “the use of subjective
considerations does not give rise to an inference of discrimination.”92
3. Stoe v. Barr
In Stoe v. Barr, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit described a white female applicant who, despite
revolutionizing her workplace, lost out on a promotion for a role, the
duties of which she had already been performing, to an applicant who had
been her subordinate. 93 Debra Stoe served first as a social science analyst
and later as a scientist for the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 94 She
spearheaded new standards-development protocols at the National
Institute of Justice (“NIJ”), the impact of which was characterized as
“immeasurable” by her superiors.95 She published nearly a dozen
performance standards, including a wholly new standard that became the
most-downloaded document on the NIJ’s website. 96 According to Davis
Hart, a division director hired in 2010 who became Stoe’s supervisor,
Stoe’s work enhanced public safety, provided other federal agencies with
guidance for compliance testing, and created “revolutionary

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 794.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Wingate v. Gage Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 34, 528 F.3d 1074, 1080 (8th Cir. 2008)).
960 F.3d 627, 630, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
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transformation” at the NIJ. 97 Further, Stoe “demonstrated capabilities that
the agency never before experienced,” Hart stated in a 2012 internal
memo.98 In 2014, after about fifteen years with the DOJ, Stoe received a
sterling performance review; she “exceeded expectations to an
exceptional degree.”99 Midway through 2014, she asked a second
supervisor, George Tillery, how she could improve.100 Tillery told her,
“[Y]ou cannot improve . . . . You can’t improve on somebody [who]
exceeds at everything.”101
But Tillery and Stoe’s relationship was not without conflict. Stoe
described Tillery as prone to interrupting her during meetings,
challenging her authority, taking credit for her ideas, and belittling her “in
front of male colleagues.”102Another female employee, who shared office
space with Stoe, described Tillery as fostering a “male-dominated
workplace culture that [was] hostile to women.” 103 Tillery, in a
deposition, admitted he had never promoted a woman to a rank higher
than Stoe’s.104
In 2010, Stoe applied for a division director position.105 Tillery hired a
male employee, Hart, over Stoe, citing Hart’s superior “supervisory and
operational experience in compliance testing and standards.” 106 After the
rejection, Stoe completed supervisory management training.107 In 2014,
she applied for the position again after it reopened.108
Stoe’s second attempt to secure the promotion also failed, as Tillery
selected another male, Mark Greene, over her. 109 Stoe later filed a lawsuit
alleging sex discrimination under Title VII. 110 The District Court for the
District of Columbia granted the DOJ’s motion for summary judgment,
and Stoe appealed.111
Stoe’s discrimination claim arose under Section 717 of Title VII, which
has been considered by circuit courts as functionally comparable to
Section 703.112 Section 717 protects federal-sector employees and
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 630-31.
Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 632.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 627.
Id.
See Bhella v. England, 91 F. App’x 835, 844 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Notwithstanding the differences
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applicants from personnel actions made based on protected traits.113 Stoe,
who was 60 years old in 2014, also alleged age discrimination under
Section 633 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). 114
The D.C. Circuit highlighted examples of inconsistencies put forth by
Tillery in his attempt to justify his decision to hire Greene. 115 First, Tillery
had previously cited Hart’s additional supervisory experience as
justification for hiring him over Stoe.116 But the court stated that by the
time Stoe sought the director position in 2014, she had 80 hours of
supervisory management training while Greene had none. 117 In addition,
Stoe was already performing a “majority” of the division director’s tasks,
while Greene had never performed such work, worked under Stoe’s
guidance in the past, and “lacked supervisory experience.”118 After the
rejection of Stoe’s application, most of the work she had already been
performing was reassigned to Greene. 119
Second, despite Tillery’s earlier emphasis on relevant experience in
hiring Hart, Tillery diminished the import of such experience in his
interview questions with Stoe.120 In assessing Stoe and Greene, Tillery
asked no questions involving relevant experience. 121 “This is critical,” the
D.C. Circuit wrote, “because Stoe had been performing many of the
responsibilities of the Division Director position already.”122 The D.C.
Circuit also wrote that the questions suggested “an attempt to distract
from Stoe’s superior qualifications.”123 Only one question focused on a
“major responsibility” of the director role — a responsibility Stoe had
already been performing for years — and Tillery asked no questions
in wording, sections [703] and [717] generally have been treated as comparable, with the standards
governing private-sector claims applied to claims under section [717].”); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
942 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Despite the difference in language . . . we have held that Title VII places the same
restrictions on federal . . . agencies as it does on private employers, . . . and so we may construe the latter
provision in terms of the former.”) (citation omitted). Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1972,
adding § 717, to extend Title VII protections to federal employees. Compare Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 717(a), 86 Stat. 103, 111, with Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964).
113. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 717(a), 86 Stat. 103, 111
(“All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment . . . shall be made free from
any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
114. The ADEA is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, the parties and the D.C. Circuit
in Stoe v. Barr considered Stoe’s claims under Title VII and the ADEA as rising or falling together. See
960 F.3d at 640.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 633.
117. Id. at 641.
118. Id. at 634, 640.
119. Id. at 638.
120. Id. at 633, 645.
121. Id. at 645.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 644.
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regarding other relevant experience.124 The D.C. Circuit wrote that
manipulating an interview process to “minimize a candidate's
strengths . . . can be taken as pretextual to cover proscribed discrimination
against the candidate.”125
Finally, the court wrote that Tillery provided “shifting and false
rationales” for rejecting Stoe.126 For example, he stated no candidate
would be selected who scored below a three (on a scale of one-five) on
any single interview question.127 However, no evidence corroborated this
ostensible ground rule, and neither of the other two interviewers were
aware of it.128 Tillery also gave differing explanations for why he selected
Greene, including that he had a better understanding of conformity
assessment — even though all three interviewers ranked Stoe higher than
Greene in this area.129
In its analysis, the D.C. Circuit reiterated that summary judgment may
only be granted when a fair-minded jury could not find for a plaintiff.130
It stated that “the weighing of the evidence[] and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts” is a function reserved for a jury, not a court.131
The court remanded the case to the district level for trial.132
4. Lewis v. Cablevision Systems Corp
Finally, in 2010, the District Court for the District of New Jersey
decided Lewis v. Cablevision Systems Corp.133 Pamela Lewis, a Black
woman, alleged race and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII after
her previous employer did not select her for a business analyst position.134
Lewis held a bachelor’s degree in accounting.135 She worked at
Cablevision, in various customer service roles, for about a decade. 136
After being passed over for two accounting positions, she worked for
eight months in city government as a grant accountant.137

124. Id. at 645.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 646.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 638.
131. Id. at 639 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 455 U.S. 252, 255 (1986)); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56.
132. Id. at 647.
133. No. CIV08–2793, 2010 WL 1133872 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2010).
134. Id. at *3.
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id.
137. Id. at *2.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol91/iss2/7

14

Londberg: Hiring Criteria and Title VII: How One Manifestation of Employer

530

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 91

Cablevision posted a business analyst position, and in July 2006, Lewis
applied.138 The posting listed the following criteria: a bachelor’s degree
in accounting or finance and at least three years of accounting or finance
experience. 139 The commencement of a master’s degree in a related
discipline was listed as a “plus” but was not required per the job
posting.140 Some subjective attributes were required, including analytical
skills, knowledge of Microsoft Excel and Access, and a willingness to
learn.141
Lewis passed both the Excel and Access tests.142 She advanced to the
interview round, but the hiring official, Paul Crane, offered the position
to a white male, who declined.143 Crane then offered the position to
another applicant, also a white male.144 Crane stated in a deposition that
he sought an applicant with a master’s degree because he believed from
personal experience that such education translated well to the job
duties.145
However, Lewis pointed out that Crane’s asserted preference for an
applicant with a master’s degree in Business Administration conflicted
with the job posting.146 The district court disagreed, even describing
Crane’s application of the hiring criteria throughout the process as
“uniform.”147
The district court ultimately granted Cablevision’s motion for
summary judgment regarding Lewis’s Title VII claims.148 The court held
that Lewis failed to establish that she could satisfy the second prong of
the prima facie case of discrimination, as she could not show she had
multiple years of experience in accounting or finance — a posted
requirement. 149 However, the court analyzed the case as if she had
satisfied her prima facie burden, for the sake of argument.150 Under its
analysis, the court wrote that “Lewis has not raised any evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to find that Crane's reasons were

138. Id. at *3.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at *7.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *8.
149. Id. at *3, *6.
150. Id. at *7 (“Even assuming Lewis had successfully established the elements of a prima facie
case of discriminatory failure to hire, she would not automatically prevail.”).
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inconsistent or otherwise unworthy of credence.”151 Though dicta, the
court’s analysis provided insight into how it views evidence of
inconsistent hiring criteria.
III. DISCUSSION
Evidence of inconsistent hiring criteria in a Title VII claim should be
viewed as an indicator of bias against applicants based on protected traits
unless another cause is clear, such as employer error or carelessness. Part
A of this Section offers a critique of the Pittman, Pribyl, Stoe, and Lewis
cases, explaining how the courts overlooked or underemphasized
inconsistent hiring criteria as evidence of bias. Discussion of these cases
is interspersed with social science literature illustrating how inconsistent
criteria hamper marginalized candidates and lead to adverse decisions
based on their protected traits. Next, Part B argues that courts should
recognize the importance of inconsistent hiring criteria evidence. When
the evidence is present and when an employer selects an applicant outside
the plaintiff’s protected class, courts should rarely grant employer
motions for summary judgment. Title VII’s scope — and summary
judgment standards — support this argument.
A. A Critique of Federal Courts Considering
Inconsistent Hiring Criteria
In the four cases outlined in Section II(D), federal courts overlooked or
underemphasized the importance of inconsistent hiring criteria. These
errors resulted in improper constrictions placed on Title VII that
trivializes this manifestation of implicit bias in hiring decisions.
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated how implicit biases
influence hiring decisions.152 In these studies, participants diminished the
strengths of marginalized applicants, including women and racial
minorities, but do not do so when race and gender are concealed.153 A
2008 study — finding evidence that shifting hiring criteria “reflects
backlash toward agentic (‘masterful’) women” — encapsulated the issue
succinctly: “[E]valuators may subtly shift the criteria they use to make
hiring decisions to benefit” white men.154
In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit in Pittman misconstrued evidence of

151.
152.
note 26.
153.
154.

Id. (emphasis added).
See generally Phelan et al., supra note 7; Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 7; Norton et al., supra
Id.
Phelan et al., supra note 7, at 406-07.
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inconsistent hiring criteria by downplaying its importance. 155 Pittman
argued her rejection was based on “unwritten criteria.” 156 Despite
recognizing the inconsistency in J&J’s purported hiring criteria, the
Eleventh Circuit failed to recognize its significance in holding that the
company’s reliance on external experience was merely an “undisclosed”
but non-discriminatory reason for its decision.157 In doing so, the court
failed to recognize that inconsistent hiring criteria can be a signal of hiring
bias as proscribed by Title VII.
In the 2004 experiment described in Section II, gender had a
demonstrable effect on participants’ hiring decisions, undermining female
applicants.158 Participants in the experiment made biased decisions while
maintaining the illusion of objectivity.159 Researchers wrote that this
cognitive dissonance — the fact that participants had to rationalize both
their recognition of a certain criterion as more important than another and
reject those outgroup candidates who possessed the desired criterion —
results in casuistry, or “specious reasoning in the service of justifying
questionable behavior.”160 People generally view themselves as impartial
and unbiased, but they are also “motivated to arrive at a desired outcome,
such as when self-interest leads people to see in-group members as more
attractive choices . . . .”161
In Pribyl, the Eighth Circuit erred by affirming summary judgment to
the Wright County Sheriff’s Office. The court should have scrutinized the
Department’s strict reliance on interview performance by the panel in
selecting finalists. The Department had at its disposal objective data,
including candidates’ time spent as a licensed deputy and educational
background, that it collected during its screening process. 162 That these
qualifications informed the Department’s selection of interviewees
indicates the Department valued experience and education credentials in
candidates. Yet Pribyl, who ranked highest among all candidates based
on the screening data, was not selected as a finalist because of her
interview performance,163 minimizing Pribyl’s strengths.164 This
155. Pittman v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, Inc., 815 F. App’x 436, 442 (11th Cir. 2020).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Norton et al., supra note 26, at 821-22. The study also found an “affirmative-action” effect, as
students manipulated selection criteria to favor Black applicants in a hypothetical college admissions
exercise. See id. at 822-24.
159. Id. at 817.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 818.
162. Pribyl v. County of Wright, 964 F.3d 793, 794 (8th Cir. 2020).
163. Id. at 796.
164. Id. (“Pribyl contends she met her burden because . . . evidence shows she was objectively more
qualified than Scherber, but the County ignored her objective qualifications and instead relied solely on
the subjective panel interview to make its decision . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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inconsistent hiring criteria derived from the Department’s initial
amplification of objective qualifications at the screening stage, only to
later base its rejection on subjective interview performance. 165
The Eighth Circuit stated that an employment decision relying on
objective and subjective criteria does not create “an inference of
discrimination.”166 This rule distorts the facts of the case. The objective
criteria only winnowed the pool of applicants. The Department, at least
for Pribyl, hung its rejection of her as a finalist not on any objective
criteria but on an interview susceptible to subjective interpretation. 167 If
the Department deemed the five finalists objectively superior to Pribyl in
some way, the Eighth Circuit failed to mention it. Presumably, Pribyl held
superior objective credentials than most, if not all, of the finalists,
considering her education, experience, and screening score were all
superior to the successful applicant’s.168
A better rule would hold that subjective considerations are acceptable
when used alongside objective ones, but that employers’ seemingly strict
reliance on subjective considerations alone when objective criteria are
available is suspect. This is particularly true when doing so devalues the
objective credentials of a marginalized candidate, and a majority
candidate with lesser credentials is hired. At that point, a jury should be
allowed to determine if the employers’ proffered reason for rejection is
true or if it conceals a discriminatory motive. As the Eastern District of
New York stated, in an unrelated case, “the [employer’s] purported
reliance on the forty[-]minute interview, rather than on the easily
accessible objective criteria, weighs in favor of a finding of pretext.”169
In a 2005 experiment from the Department of Psychology at Yale
University, researchers found both male and female evaluators inflated
certain characteristics to benefit male applicants for a hypothetical role as
police chief.170 Both male and female evaluators “tended to construct
criteria favorable to the male applicant . . . .”171 For example, evaluators
deemed formal education characteristics as “more important when the
male applicant possessed them” but less important when a female did.172
Similarly, traits such as “family oriented” and parenthood were
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 795. Panelists explained their decision to reject Pribyl based on such things as an “odd”
and “unresponsive” answer to a question. Id. The panelists also noted that Pribyl's answers were generally
“very short and to the point.” Id.
168. Id. at 794.
169. Holmes v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV-03-1084, 2006 WL 1581434 (E.D.N.Y
May 25, 2006).
170. Uhlmann & Cohen, supra note 7, at 475.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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considered important by the evaluators when the male applicant
possessed them, but less so when he did not.173 The researchers thus found
that participants “construct criteria favorable to the male applicant.”174
Male evaluators exhibited this bias more than females. 175 Participants did
not always recognize their biases at work. “Remarkably,” researchers
wrote, “perceiving one’s judgments as objective and free of bias predicted
greater gender bias.176 Participants were, apparently, under an illusion of
objectivity . . . . discriminating against women while convinced that their
judgments were objective.”177
In Stoe, the D.C. Circuit properly reversed the trial court’s grant of an
employer’s motion for summary judgment.178 However, given the
evidence that the DOJ employed inconsistent hiring criteria when it
rejected sterling candidate Debra Stoe, the court’s analysis delved too
deeply into the record in search of discrimination. Instead, for two distinct
reasons, it should have held the presence of inconsistent hiring criteria
alone satisfied the plaintiff’s burden to show pretext.
First, the evidence of inconsistent hiring criteria was robust. When Stoe
first applied for a director position in 2010, Tillery, the hiring supervisor,
selected a male over her because of the male candidate’s “supervisory and
operational experience in compliance testing and standards . . . .”179 But
in 2014, in Stoe’s second attempt to land the job, the male candidate
lacked supervisory training, had no experience on a standards committee,
had completed no responsibilities equivalent to those performed in the
director role, and had not created entire standards development and
conformity assessment programs.180 Stoe had accomplished all of this, but
Tillery selected the male candidate.181 If Stoe had lost out previously to a
candidate because she had less supervisory and relevant experience than
the chosen candidate, one can fairly assume such qualities were deemed
important in the selection of a suitable director. Yet in Stoe’s second quest
for the directorship, these qualities were undermined. Only one of five
interview questions focused on Stoe’s major strength — the director-level
work she had already performed. 182 Tillery asked no questions about
relevant experience.183 In addition, after citing Stoe’s lack of leadership
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477.
Id. (citations omitted).
Stoe v. Barr, 960 F.3d 627, 647 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 640-41.
Id.
Id. at 644-45.
Id. at 645.
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upon her rejection in 2010, Tillery overlooked Stoe’s superior supervisory
experience in 2014.184 Devaluation of a marginalized candidate’s
strengths is a hallmark of the social science experiments that found
consideration of applicant race or gender can generate inconsistent hiring
criteria.
Second, though the D.C. Circuit stated that minimizing a candidate’s
strengths in this way “can be taken as pretextual to cover proscribed
discrimination,” the court still mined the record for more evidence of
pretext, leaving an improper impression — that shifting hiring criteria is
insufficient evidence for a plaintiff to reach a jury.185 The court concluded
that Stoe had established a genuine issue of material fact because she
possessed superior qualifications over the male candidate and had
established various flaws in the employer’s explanation for rejecting
her.186 The court also cited Tillery’s shifting rationales for rejecting Stoe
in 2014, his selection of another female candidate to the final round of
interviews to mask gender bias, and his manipulation of the interview
process to elevate the male candidate as other flaws. 187
This evidence rendered Stoe’s discrimination claim more believable,
but at the summary judgment stage, the evidence was gratuitous. Stoe had
satisfied her burden of showing pretext simply by demonstrating Tillery’s
shifting criteria. Tillery justified hiring Greene by invoking his grasp of
technology policy and better understanding of conformity assessment
“potential.”188 The D.C. Circuit did not mention whether Tillery
considered these qualifications the first time he rejected Stoe in 2010,
missing an opportunity to further assess Tillery’s inconsistencies in the
purported hiring criteria invoked to reject Stoe.
The 2008 study cited earlier in this Section provided volunteers with
two scripts that described hypothetical applicants, one of which better
exhibited applicants’ leadership and competence, the other their social
skills.189 The volunteers, aware of applicant gender, devalued traits in a
manner that diminished women’s likelihood of being hired.190 For
example, volunteers valued competence more than social skills, except
when a woman lacked social skills.191 When a woman lacked social skills,
volunteers amplified the importance of social skills, thus inflating the

184. Id. at 641 (“DOJ tries to downplay Stoe’s 80 hours of supervisory training, but that was 80
more hours than Greene had when he was selected to lead the division.”).
185. Id. at 645.
186. Id. at 642.
187. Id. at 645-46.
188. Id. at 637.
189. Phelan et al., supra note 7, at 408.
190. Id. at 409-10.
191. Id. at 410
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importance of female applicants’ underdeveloped trait.192 At the same
time, volunteers diminished the importance of female competency. 193
This shifting criteria provide “means by which agentic women suffer
employment discrimination.”194 Researchers described this bias as
“backlash” toward successful women.195
The Lewis decision properly held that a Title VII plaintiff failed to
meet her prima facie burden.196 The position at Cablevision called for a
minimum of three years of accounting experience, which Lewis lacked.197
But the court analyzed Lewis’ argument for pretext, assuming arguendo
that she had satisfied her prima facie case.198 The hiring manager sought
a candidate with a specific master’s degree, in conflict with the education
level listed in the job posting (which described mere commencement of a
master’s degree “in a related discipline” as a “plus”).199 This shifting
criterion may have undermined Lewis’ own higher education, as she did
not have a master’s degree at the time she applied for the Cablevision
position, though she obtained one less than a year later.200
The Lewis court framed the hiring official’s preference for a candidate
with a master’s degree as a subjective business decision, immune from
judicial review.201 The court misconstrued the issue, however, by
deeming the employer’s proffered hiring criteria a matter of business
judgment, rather than interrogating whether the criteria themselves were
sufficiently inconsistent to indicate bias was at play. While the court
found no evidence of inconsistency in the hiring process, the literature
described in this Section shows that bias motivates inconsistent hiring
criteria. 202 Though dicta, the court’s opinion wrongly undervalues the
importance of shifting criteria in proving pretext, and thus hampers future
plaintiffs with legitimate Title VII claims.
A 2002 experiment found similar results as the previous studies, but in
a racial context.203 Though focused on college application decisions, the
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Lewis v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., No. CIV08–2793, 2010 WL 1133872, at *6 (D.N.J Mar. 22,
2010).
197. Id. at *2-*3.
198. Id. at *7. The court’s analysis, arguendo, confuses the issues as it both assumes Lewis met her
prima facie case, and thus was qualified for the position, while also invoking Lewis’ deficient
qualifications in deciding that “no reasonable jury could find that Lewis's work experience and
background qualified her for the job.” Id.
199. Id. at *3.
200. Id. at *1.
201. Id. at *7.
202. Id.
203. See Gordon Hodson, John F. Dovidio, & Samuel L. Gaertner, Processes in Racial
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experiment is sufficiently analogous to hiring for inclusion in this
Comment, given that college admissions boards and hiring officials share
as their objective the selection of candidates from a pool based on
applicant characteristics. The study manipulated two broad traits: high
school performance (including GPA) and college board scores (SAT
scores). 204 Generally, participants considered high school achievement as
more important than college board scores.205 However, when a Black
applicant demonstrated high school success but poor board scores,
participants “weighed college board scores more heavily . . . .”206 The
same inverse relationship occurred when Black applicants had high board
scores but subpar high school success — participants inflated the
importance of school achievement.207 Researchers wrote that the
experiment considered “how changing criteria for Black and [w]hite
applicants may relate to discrimination.”208 Black applicants’ strengths
were diminished, and their weaknesses magnified by study
participants.209
Like the 2005 experiment detailed above, researchers discussed how
participants may be exhibiting “aversive racism” in ostensibly relying on
qualifications for their biased decisions.210 “[T]he aversive racism
framework . . . proposes that [w]hites’ bias against Blacks is most likely
to be expressed when socially appropriate, normative responses are less
clearly defined and negative responses can be justified on factors other
than race.”211 A biased hirer, in other words, would likely not attribute
their selection decision to bias but rather to the selection criteria that their
very bias manipulated.212
The scholarship described in this Section illustrates the subtlety of this
Discrimination: Differential Weighting of Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 460, 468-69 (2002).
204. Id. at 465, 467.
205. Id. at 467.
206. Id. at 468.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 469.
209. Id. But see Norton et al., supra note 26, at 823-24 (describing experiment in which volunteers
amplified academic success criterion when Black applicants possessed it, thus favoring Black applicants).
210. Hodson et al., supra note 203, at 461.
211. Id. at 469.
212. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 1, 9 n.29 (2006). Bagenstos writes, in the context of implicit bias in termination and promotion
decisions:
“Aversive racism” theory posits that individuals who hold egalitarian views feel discomfort
around minorities because of the cognitive dissonance between their sincere belief in equality and
their unconscious biases. This discomfort, the theory goes, leads people (if unconsciously) to
rationalize what are in fact biased decisions as being driven by some neutral motivation.
Id.
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manifestation of implicit bias. Biased hiring officials who manipulate
hiring criteria to favor white or male (or white and male) candidates may,
due to cognitive dissonance, be under the illusion that they are acting
fairly. But the studies show that this manipulation is borne of applicants’
protected traits, such as their sex or race. Only when these attributes are
revealed in these studies do evaluators’ biased actions — such as
diminishing female applicants’ strengths — spring to life. Thus, because
of their race or sex, marginalized applicants’ chances at landing a job are
diminished. Decision-making of this nature is precisely the type of
conduct proscribed by Title VII.213 Accordingly, courts must view
inconsistent hiring criteria, and hiring officials who put forth nondiscriminatory explanations for these inconsistencies, with closer
skepticism.
B. Title VII and Summary Judgment Standards Demand Courts
Better Check Inconsistent Hiring Criteria
The social science literature described in the previous Section
establishes that shifting hiring criteria is a bellwether of bias that can lead
to hiring decisions improperly based on a plaintiff’s race and gender. The
scope of Title VII should protect against this form of discrimination. In
addition, summary judgment standards in Title VII cases allow only
narrow grounds for employers to prevail. Taken together, inconsistent
hiring criteria should defeat an employer’s motion for summary
judgment.
Title VII’s protections are expansive.214 Bias that infiltrates a hiring
official’s decision and segregates applicants into favored and disfavored
categories must be prohibited. That implicit bias, rather than conscious
bias, may motivate inconsistent hiring criteria should not be construed in
such a way as to make it a valid defense to Title VII discrimination claims.
Though some courts have been reluctant to penalize employers for
unconscious bias,215 the preferable view is to consider such biased
actions, even those taken unconsciously, as proscribed by Title VII.216
213. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (“It shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). The law forbids employers from limiting, segregating, or
classifying their “employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.” Id. (emphasis added).
215. See Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1146-52 (1999) (arguing that
while “there are no absolute statutory impediments to plaintiffs’ recovery for unconscious forms of bias
under current law, current doctrine and practice are stacked against recovery in many cases”).
216. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind’, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,
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Scholars Rebecca Hanner White and Linda Hamilton Krieger have
asserted that Title VII and Supreme Court decisions should be read as
“rejecting a requirement of conscious intent” in disparate-treatment
cases. 217 They added that “if an employee's race or sex played a role in
the employer's decision, then a disparate treatment claim should exist.”218
As the previous Section established, race and sex motivated biased hiring
decisions resulting from inconsistent criteria. Thus, applicants eliminated
from job contention based on inconsistent criteria should have a valid
Title VII claim.
To judicially terminate a claim with evidence of inconsistent hiring
criteria at the summary judgment stage not only insults Title VII but also
improperly broadens summary judgment for employers. Courts must
reserve the function of drawing inferences from the record to the jury.219
Inconsistent hiring criteria creates a genuine issue as to whether an
employer’s proffered reason for rejecting a candidate was nondiscriminatory or was instead pretextual, mandating the rejection of
summary judgment.
A plaintiff who can show an employer’s asserted non-discriminatory
reason is “unworthy of credence” such that the said reason was clearly
pretext for implicit biases can defeat summary judgment.220 Plaintiffs
show pretext by pointing to the “weaknesses, implausibilities,

44-45 (1991). Gotanda writes that a view of racism that manifests only in the prejudices of certain
individuals ignores institutional or structural racism:
[T]he [U.S. Supreme] Court often invokes the metaphor of the “equal starting point” when
analyzing social problems. This metaphor ignores historical-race and the cumulative
disadvantages that are the starting point for so many Black citizens. The metaphor implies that if
Blacks are under-represented in a particular employment situation, it must be a result of market
forces. Any statistical correlation is either coincidental or beyond the control of the employer, and
in any case unrelated to the employer's past practices. In short, color-blind constitutionalists live
in an ideological world where racial subordination is ubiquitous yet disregarded—unless it takes
the form of individual, intended, and irrational prejudice.
Id. at 45-46. Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324-25 (1987).
[T]he existing intent requirement's assignment of individualized fault or responsibility for the
existence of racial discrimination distorts our perceptions about the causes of discrimination and
leads us to think about racism in a way that advances the disease rather than combatting it. By
insisting that a blameworthy perpetrator be found before the existence of racial discrimination can
be acknowledged, the Court creates an imaginary world where discrimination does not exist unless
it was consciously intended.
Id.
217. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination
in Multi-Actor Employment Decision-Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 498-99 (2001).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
220. Youssef v. Holder, 19 F. Supp. 3d 167, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850
F.3d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 2017).
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inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in hirers’ proffered
explanations for rejecting a candidate. 221 Inconsistent hiring criteria
weaken and discredit an employer’s proffered reason, especially given
social science literature. When inconsistent hiring criteria are present,
employer motions for summary judgment must fail.
IV. CONCLUSION
Evidence of inconsistent hiring criteria should be sufficient to defeat
summary judgment motions from employers. This conclusion finds
support in the broad scope of the text and interpretations of Title VII, in
the narrow path to summary judgment for employers, and in the numerous
studies describing how shifting criteria can be motivated by bias and
diminish marginalized candidates’ job prospects. In these complex cases,
where even officials responsible for biased decisions may be under an
illusion of objectivity, courts should defer to the jury function to weigh
evidence and draw inferences.
After seeing their strengths downplayed or overlooked by employers
because of race and gender, plaintiffs deserve judicial recognition of the
merits of their Title VII claims. Doing so, in the words of Crenshaw,
would be a step toward forcing whites, and particularly white men, to
confront the myth that merit drives their success.

221. Youssef, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 196.
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